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A B S T R A C T
UK Research Councils (UKRCs) spend around £3bn pa supporting R&D and innovation. We provide a compre-
hensive assessment of these grants on the performance of participating UK firms, using data on all projects
funded by UKRCs over the 2004–2016 period and applying a propensity score matching approach. We exploit
the richness of the data available in the Gateway to Research database by investigating the heterogeneous effect
of these projects across several novel directions which have not been explored before. We find a positive effect
on the employment and turnover growth of participating firms, both in the short and in the medium term.
Exploring impacts across different types of firms we find stronger performance impacts for firms in R&D in-
tensive industries and for smaller and less productive firms. We also consider how impacts vary depending on the
characteristics of the funded research projects in terms of partners characteristics, receipt of other research
grants and grant value. Finally, we focus on the different sources of grants, analysing in particular the evolution
in the funding strategy of Innovate UK. Our results have implications for the extent and targeting of future
Research Council funding both in the UK and elsewhere.
1. Introduction
Through its publicly-funded Research Councils (UKRCs), the UK
invests around £3bn pa in supporting R&D and innovation. This in-
vestment is set to increase sharply in future years as the Industrial
Strategy Challenge Fund – announced in the 2016 Autumn Statement –
is steadily expanded to an additional £2bn pa by 2020. To date, as-
sessments of the impact of UKRC grants have been largely partial and
case-based. Where quantitative assessments of impact have been at-
tempted they have often relied on the limited information available in
innovation surveys or focused on specific elements of the public science
system.1 However, several previous reviews provide evidence from a
range of countries on the positive role of research grants, subsidies and
tax credits in helping firms to innovate successfully (Zuniga-Vicente
et al., 2014; Becker, 2015; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). A more limited
strand of the literature looks at the impact of R&D subsidies and pro-
grammes on the overall performance of firms, taking into consideration
turnover or productivity growth (Belderbos et al., 2004; Cin et al.,
2017). Although somewhat mixed, this literature has generally
supported the existence of a positive relationship between public R&D
support, innovation and firms’ growth (Aguiar and Gagnepain, 2017).
In this study we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the ef-
fects of UK public support for R&D and innovation on the performance of
UK firms. We draw on funding and partnership data from the Gateway to
Research (GtR) portal which provides information on funding provided
by all of the UK Research Councils over the 2004–2016 period as well as
the characteristics of the partners involved in each research project. Of
particular importance in terms of business engagement within the UKRCs
are Innovate UK, which provides grants to firms and other organisations
to support innovation, and the Engineering and Physical Science
Research Council (EPSRC), which funds university research often in
collaboration with industry. We match the GtR data with the Business
Structure Database, which provides longitudinal data on the performance
of all UK firms in terms of employment and turnover growth. This allows
us to assess the impacts on business growth of participating in UKRC
funded projects but also to explore how growth impacts vary depending
on firm characteristics, project participants and the particular Research
Council providing finance.
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Our study responds to the call by Scandura (2016) for more ex-
tensive research on the performance effects of publicly-funded scientific
research, and arguments for more extensive access to and use of ad-
ministrative data for research by academics and governmental institu-
tions (OECD2 ; National Science Foundation3 ; ISTAT4 and the UK Data
Forum5). In extending the existing evidence base, we make four main
contributions. First, we provide the first comprehensive assessment of
the business performance impacts of public science investments in the
UK, comparing the heterogeneous effects across sectors, regions and
firms. Secondly, exploiting the richness of the data provided by the GtR
portal, we provide novel insights into how the characteristics of in-
dividual projects and the characteristics of project partners influence
their returns. Do projects with more participants, international parti-
cipants or university partners generate greater returns? How do returns
differ depending on whether projects are UK-led or led by international
partners? Third, thanks to the longitudinal data on both firm perfor-
mance and grant receipt, we are able to assess the dynamic relationship
between firms’ participation to RC-funded projects and firms’ growth in
the short and medium-term. Finally, we disentangle the effect of par-
ticipating in research projects funded by different RCs, mainly focusing
on the two RCs most directly involved with private firms - EPSRC and
Innovate UK. We pay particular attention to the evolution of Innovate
UK funding, considering the role the agency assumed after the closure
of the English Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in 2012.
We employ a propensity score matching technique to analyse the
differences in performance growth between firms who participated in
RC-funded projects and a matched comparator group of firms which
received no support based on their probability of participation.
Comparing their performance before and after project participation, we
are able to estimate the causal effect of publicly-funded research grants
on the performance of participating firms. Our assessment takes into
account firm heterogeneity in terms of size, past performance and in-
novative activities, productivity and other factors influencing the self-
selection of firms into publicly-funded R&D projects. Our results show
that participating in RC-funded projects had a positive impact on firms’
growth although as expected this effect varies depending on the nature
of the participating firm, the characteristics of project participants and
the funder.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
comprehensive review of the main theoretical and empirical literature
which links R&D support, innovation and firm performance. Section 3
presents the data used and discusses some preliminary statistics. Section
4 explains the variables used and the econometric methodology
adopted in the empirical investigation. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results of the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes summar-
ising the key results, and presenting some policy implications.
2. Conceptual framework
Public support for private R&D is generally justified in terms either
of market failures linked to firms’ difficulty in appropriating the returns
from R&D, or by more strategic objectives linked to a desire to build
capacity in specific sectors, technologies or localities. In either case the
objective is to incentivise increased levels of private sector R&D activity
which, it is hoped, will, in the longer term, lead to increased innovation
capabilities and improvements in business performance. Following this
pivotal justification, two main relationships have been investigated by
the previous literature: a ‘weak’ link from public support to R&D and
innovation, and a ‘strong’ link from public support to business perfor-
mance through innovation (Porter and Van de Linde, 1995).
2.1. The rationale for public support to private R&D and innovation
The key rationale for providing public support for private R&D and
innovation is the potential impact on knowledge and value creation.
The existing literature has identified four mechanisms which may link
public R&D support for firms to increased innovation activity and
economic performance.
First, public R&D support will increase liquidity and financial slack
in recipient companies which may help to overcome innovation risk
and increase the likelihood that a firm will undertake risky projects
such as innovations (Zona, 2012). Slack resources may also have ne-
gative effects, however, as managers are insulated from market reali-
ties, encouraging inertia or poor resource allocation towards highly
risky projects (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). These opposing effects suggest
the potential for an inverted U-shape relationship between slack and
innovation, where too little slack hinders innovation, while too much
may reduce firms’ incentives to innovate, with the potential risk of
over-subsidising innovation and increasing grant dependency (Kilponen
and Santavirta, 2007).
Second, through cost-sharing, public support for private R&D and
innovation reduces the required investment and de-risks private in-
vestment. Profit maximising models of firms’ decision to innovate
suggest that the go/no-go decision will be linked positively to antici-
pated post-innovation returns, and negatively related to the perceived
risks associated with the project (Calantone et al., 2010; Mechlin and
Berg, 1980). The perceived risks associated with a project will itself
reflect both the technologies involved, and concerns about the com-
mercial viability of any resulting innovation in terms of expected sales
and profitability (Keizer and Halman, 2007; Roper et al., 2008; Cabrales
et al., 2008). Technological innovation risks relate to situations where
development projects fail to achieve the desired technological or per-
formance outcomes, where innovations prove impossible to deliver in a
cost-effective manner (Astebro and Michela, 2005), or where there are
issues around project duration (Menon et al., 2002; Von Stamm, 2003).
Commercial risks associated with innovation may relate to uncertain
demand (Astebro and Michela, 2005), or issues around rivalry or ap-
propriability (Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009; Leiponen and Byma, 2009).
The technological and market related elements of innovation risk are
interlinked. Radical innovation projects, for example, are more complex
in both technological and managerial terms (Keizer and Halman, 2007).
In this context, public support may encourage firms to undertake pro-
jects with a higher risk-reward ratio, with the potential for a greater
impact where rates of subsidy are higher. At the same time, there is a
risk of negative selection bias if subsidy rates are high and this en-
courages firms to seek public support for their riskier projects.
Third, where there are market failures, public support for
2 OECD (2013), ‘New Data for Understanding the Human Condition:
International Perspectives’, OECD Global Science Forum Report on Data and
Research Infrastructure for the Social Sciences, available at http://www.oecd.
org/sti/sci-tech/new-data-for-understanding-the-human-condition.pdf.
3 Card, D., Chetty, R., Feldstein, M. and Saez, E. (2011), ‘Expanding Access to
Administrative Data for Research in the United States’, written for the NSF call
for white papers on ‘Future Research in the Social, Behavioural & Economic
Sciences, available at: https://eml.berkeley.edu/∼saez/card-chetty-feldstein-
saezNSF10dataaccess.pdf.
4 “For a number of well-known reasons, expanding the use of administrative
data in the production of business statistics is something between a desirable
goal and an inescapable necessity”, in Costanzo, L, ‘Use of Administrative Data
and Use of Estimation Methods for Business Statistics in Europe: an Overview’.
National Institute for Statistics Italy (ISTAT), Division of Statistical Registers,
Administrative Data and Statistics on Public Administration, available at
https://www.ine.pt.
5 UK Strategy for Data Resources for Social and Economic Research 2013-
2018, a five-year plan to inform and guide the development and related re-
sources for social and economic research, e.g. “there is optimism that much
better access to administrative data sources will yield major benefits” (p. 5),
“Administrative data, routinely collected by public sector organisations and
relating to individuals, have enormous research potential either to enhance
existing surveys or census data, or in their own right” (p.10), available at
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/files/research/uk-strategy-for-data-resources-for-
social-and-economic-research/.
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innovation may have market-making objectives to address particular
social or economic challenges (Mazzucato, 2016). For example, there
may be a particular role for public sector market-making where tech-
nologies are emergent and markets uncertain (Van Alphen et al., 2009),
or where there are wider social benefits (e.g. to disadvantaged groups)
from an innovation (Zehavi and Breznitz, 2017).
Fourth, public R&D and innovation support can play an enabling or
bridging role, helping firms to access otherwise unavailable new or pre-
existing knowledge. Innovation vouchers, for example, incentivise firms
to approach knowledge providers, something they may not have done
without the voucher. At the same time vouchers incentivise knowledge
providers to work with new partners who they might not have worked
with otherwise (OECD, 2010). Once partnerships are formed, subsidies
may support individual or collaborative R&D activity which may lead to
the creation of new knowledge, skills and capabilities. These, in turn,
may lead to either rent-based or pure knowledge spillovers and eco-
nomic growth (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001).
2.2. From public R&D support to innovation and business performance
A large body of literature provides empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between public R&D support, innovation and business per-
formance. Particularly vast is the literature investigating the effective-
ness of R&D subsidies and other public support strategies in promoting
innovation inputs such as R&D investments. Zuniga-Vicente et al.
(2014), reviewing more than seventy empirical studies on the re-
lationship between subsidies and R&D investment, conclude that the
large majority of studies find a positive effect with public subsidies,
thus adding to private R&D investment. However, the authors stress
how some critical issues related to this analysis have been largely ne-
glected, such as firms’ R&D dynamics and composition, the source of R&
D public funding (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014), and other con-
straints faced by firms. Another review by Becker (2015) concludes that
the policy additionality effect is particularly strong for small firms,
which are more likely to experience external financial constraints, and
that these firms are more likely to start investing in R&D if they receive
a subsidy. Becker (2015) also concludes that more recent literature
suggests a shift away from earlier findings that public subsidies can
crowd out private R&D towards evidence that subsidies typically sti-
mulate private R&D, one reason being the availability of new econo-
metric techniques that control for sample selection bias. In a more re-
cent review of more than fifty micro-level studies published since 2000,
Dimos and Pugh (2017), using a meta-regression analysis, also in-
vestigate the effectiveness of R&D subsidies on either firms’ R&D input
or output. Despite the lack of conclusiveness of the evaluation litera-
ture, this review rejects any crowding-out effect of private investment
by public subsidies, but also finds no evidence of substantial addition-
ality. In addition, the authors also stress the importance of controlling
for firm heterogeneity in order to properly estimate the effectiveness of
R&D public support and reduce the bias related to omitted variables
which could explain the participation of firms into support programmes
and thus influence the magnitude of the estimated effects (Greene,
2009; Dimos and Pugh, 2017).
In addition, the most recent literature has pointed out how other
factors might influence the effectiveness of public R&D support. For
example, based on an analysis of Italian companies, Zona (2012) finds
that financial slack in businesses offsets risk-aversion, and encourages
various types of investment in innovation especially through reces-
sionary periods.6 In terms of analyses of specific R&D programmes, the
European Union Framework Programmes have attracted much atten-
tion, with several studies analysing the impact on innovation inputs
(Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2013; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2014).
Positive additionality is also found in studies analysing public support
programmes in Spain, Flanders, France and Korea (Gonzales et al.,
2005; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Bedu and Vanderstocken
2015; Cin et al., 2017; respectively). Overall, while conceptual argu-
ments are ambiguous, the balance of empirical evidence therefore
suggests a positive link between financial resources and innovation
input.
The effect of public R&D and innovation support on innovation
outputs has also received considerable attention in the literature, albeit
less than that on innovation inputs. Similarly to Zona (2012) for in-
novation inputs, Marlin and Geiger (2015) for instance in their analysis
of US manufacturing firms emphasise how firms can combine bundles
of uncommitted resources to improve innovation outcomes. Becker
et al. (2016) using panel data on the UK and Spain have evaluated the
effectiveness of regional, national and EU innovation support in pro-
moting the extent of innovation activity and its market success. For
both the UK and Spain, the authors find that national innovation sup-
port is associated with a higher probability of product or service in-
novation, and the degree of novelty of product or service innovations.
Evidence for Korea suggests a weaker relationship, however, between
public R&D support and innovation outcomes dependent on firms’ size
and internal capabilities (Lee, 2015). Recent studies identifying positive
effects on innovation output as measured by companies’ patenting ac-
tivities or applications include Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014), Doh
and Kim (2014), Howell (2017) and Wang et al. (2017). Other studies
use R&D employment or R&D jobs as innovation output measures. For
instance, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) have reviewed the value-
for-money of a specific government-sponsored commercial R&D pro-
gramme in Flanders, considering how these effects could vary over
time, according to the different sources of funding and the cumulative
and sequential impact of different supported projects for each single
firm. The authors find a positive impact of public support on the
creation of new R&D jobs, with a stable effect over time regardless of
the subsidy's sources and the number of grants received.
The positive effects of public R&D support on private R&D invest-
ment and innovation do not necessarily mean that these public pro-
grammes enhance productivity and thus eventually contribute to eco-
nomic growth (Cin et al., 2017). In order to assess the existence of such
relationship, a second stream of research has emerged, investigating the
link between public R&D support, innovation input, output and firm
performance (see Table A1).
The first papers in this field focused mostly on United States in-
novation and technology programmes, providing mixed evidence of
impacts on productivity and profitability (Lerner, 1999; Wallsten, 2000;
Feldman and Kelley, 2003). Positive performance effects of the Eur-
opean Union Framework Programmes have been identified by Bayona-
Sáez and García-Marco (2010), for example. Overall, the range of these
studies is broad, and the results are again mixed. Some studies find that
subsidy recipients achieve higher innovative productivity and are more
likely to improve their financial performance (Lerner, 1999; Zhao and
Ziedonis, 2012; Howell, 2017). Most of the literature has identified a
positive role played by R&D public support on firms’ investments (Von
Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015), employment growth (Criscuolo et al., 2016),
and value added (Duch et al., 2009). However, other studies suggest
that public innovation grants do not significantly improve firms’ pro-
ductivity, employment growth or export performance (Klette et al.,
2000; Wallsten, 2000; Duguet, 2004; Gorg and Strobl 2007; Martin,
2012; Karhunen and Huovari, 2015; De Blasio et al., 2015; Criscuolo
et al., 2016).
For instance, Criscuolo et al. (2016) examining a regional analysis of
the changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a major pro-
gramme of investment subsidies, find that areas eligible for public
support create significantly more manufacturing jobs. However, this
6 Moreover, several studies have focused their attention on the role played by
uncommitted resources in setting up collaborative R&D projects between pri-
vate and public organisations which may also allow firms to share risks with
partners, but also raise additional issues around IP ownership and leakage (see
below elaboration on collaborative projects).
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effect seems to exist solely for small firms, which experience a higher
probability of entry and larger investment, without any significant ef-
fect on total factor productivity. Similarly, another study by Cin et al.
(2017) has recently investigated the effects of R&D promotion policy on
the performance of SMEs in South Korea. Controlling for counterfactual
outcomes employing a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology, the
authors find significant evidence of positive effects of the public R&D
subsidy on the productivity of Korean manufacturing SMEs. However,
Wang et al. (2017) using administrative data on applications to China's
Innofund programme, find no evidence that receiving an innovation
grant boosts performance in terms of survival or venture funding.
Among the reasons for the heterogeneity of the results of studies
analysing the effects of public support on innovation inputs, outputs,
and firm performance, perhaps the most important are that the design
and implementation of subsidy programmes varies markedly across
countries, regions, industries, and time periods, and that researchers
use different methods and units of analysis in their studies (Klette et al.,
2000). Furthermore, differences in the R&D stage at which funding
occurs may explain differences in results. For instance, Hottenrott et al.
(2017) find that research grants have stronger impacts than develop-
ment grants, while Clausen (2009) concludes that research subsidies
stimulate private R&D, while development subsidies act as a substitute.
Another possible explanation for the lack of consistency in the
empirical findings on the additionality of public R&D and innovation
support is the limited theory available which predicts the types of ef-
fects which should arise from public R&D intervention on the perfor-
mance of firms (Wang et al., 2017). Particularly relevant in this regard
is the methodological approach followed by researchers and the ability
to properly estimate the counterfactual associated with subsidy receipt
(Jaffe, 2013). Since programmes do not use random assignment to al-
locate grants, it is very difficult to isolate selection effects from treat-
ment effects. Previous research has used several approaches to over-
come this problem, including identifying the potential outcome,
estimating two-step selection models, comparing beneficiaries to a
sample of applicants who did not receive grants, and using structural
approaches. Both selection and matching are key methodological issues
which have to be considered in order to properly evaluate the effec-
tiveness of public support to private R&D.
There are also a growing number of studies examining the effects of
subsidies on high-tech entrepreneurship. Colombo et al. (2012), for
instance, find that selective, in contrast with automatic, national sup-
port schemes have a significant and large positive effect on the em-
ployment growth of young, i.e. up to 5 years old, new technology-based
firms (NTBFs) in Italy. The effect on more mature such firms (6–25
years) is negligible, as is the effect of automatic schemes on NTBFs of
either age group.7 The authors point out that automatic support
schemes are not offered in all countries, and indeed the majority of
research on the effect of subsidies has considered selective schemes, as
we do in our analysis below. Using a similar sample, Colombo et al.
(2013) find that public subsidies can help small NTBFs to persistently
remove the financial constraints that restrict their capital investment
activity. Related to NTBFs are young innovative companies, a concept
introduced by the European Commission (EC-DG ENTR, 2009)8 in a
move to reinforce policies towards potential radical, rather than in-
cremental, innovators in the light of the anticipated positive effects on
productivity. Czarnitzki and Delanote (2013) show in a sample of
Flemish firms, that young innovative firms grow faster than NTBFs and
small young firms, indicating that the R&D requirement matters.
Finally, another strand of the policy evaluation literature considers
the differences between public innovation policies aimed at helping
individual firms’ projects compared to subsidies which target colla-
borative research projects (see Table A2). These studies add to the
substantial evidence from a range of countries on the benefits of col-
laborative innovation and the positive role of universities in helping
firms to innovate successfully (Love et al., 2011; Woerter and Roper,
2010; Rantisi, 2002; Petruzzelli, 2011; Laursen and Salter, 2006;
Bellucci et al., 2016). The main benefits highlighted by this literature
include fostering firms’ innovativeness by internalising positive spil-
lovers, sharing risks, accelerating or upgrading the quality of the in-
novations made, and signalling the quality of firms’ innovation activ-
ities. However, analysis of collaborative R&D projects indicates that
alongside the benefits there might also be significant drawbacks asso-
ciated with research alliances, such as the costs of finding suitable
partners, coordinating and managing research networks, possible
leakage of innovation and technologies, free-riding and opportunistic
behaviours (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Lokshin et al., 2011; Hottenrott
and Lopes-Bento, 2016; Bellucci et al., 2016).
In terms of the effects of collaborative subsidies on innovation in-
puts, Bellucci et al. (2016) focus on the effectiveness of regional R&D
policies designed to support firms’ individual projects on the one hand,
or collaborative R&D ventures between firms and universities on the
other hand. Using a difference-in-difference approach the authors show
that the supported individual projects are successful in stimulating
additional R&D investment. On the contrary, public support to firm-
university collaboration seems to have weaker but nonetheless positive
effects on the same measure of innovation input. Scandura (2016) fo-
cused on the R&D impacts of Engineering and Physical Sciences Re-
search Council (EPSRC) grants awarded to university-industry colla-
borations in the UK, finding a positive and significant impact on firms’
R&D expenditures per employee. She also measures the effects on in-
novation output, identifying a positive and significant impact on the
share of R&D employment two years after the end of projects.
The empirical literature analysing the impact of subsidies for R&D
collaboration on firms’ economic performance has also resulted in
mixed results, although generally agreeing on the existence of a positive
relationship between the support of close-to-market R&D cooperation
and economic performance (Aguiar and Gagnepain, 2017). For in-
stance, Barajas et al. (2012) analysed the effects of international re-
search joint ventures supported by the EU Framework Programme on
Spanish firms’ economic performance. Considering the selection process
for the participation of firms into this type of cooperative project, their
empirical analysis confirms that subsidised R&D cooperation has a
positive impact on the growth of intangible fixed assets, with indirect
positive effects on the productivity of participating firms. Aguiar and
Gagnepain (2017) have analysed research joint ventures supported by
the 5th EU Framework programme and their impact on companies’
performance. Stressing that R&D collaborations are activities char-
acterised by long-term objectives, their results suggest strong long-term
effects on the labour productivity of participants, growing by at least
44% four years after the beginning of the collaborative project. Bellucci
et al. (2016) find weaker effects on firm performance from support to
individual projects or support to collaborative R&D ventures between
firms and universities, than on innovation as elaborated earlier. Dif-
ferences in the results of these empirical studies might be related to the
different frameworks of the supporting programmes, the types of
partners involved and the focus of the collaborative projects, frequently
differing between industry-oriented or knowledge-oriented projects
(Hewitt-Dundas et al., 2017). For instance, different types of partners
may shape project objectives and duration, with market-based colla-
borations reducing project duration of all types of projects while col-
laborations with universities and research institutes only reducing the
duration of complex projects (Du et al., 2014).
While the empirical evidence on the business performance effects of
7 However, the authors emphasise that only 12% of the subsidisation events
recorded in the data involved a selective subsidy for a young NTBF.
8 The EC defines these as companies that are less than 6 years old, have fewer
than 250 employees, and are highly R&D-intensive, which in turn is defined as
R&D spending accounting for more than 15% of a company's total operating
expenses. In comparison, NTBFs should only have an R&D intensity larger than
zero.
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public support for R&D and innovation is not entirely consistent it
suggests several expectations for our empirical analysis. First, the bal-
ance of evidence suggests we might expect to find a positive linkage
between UK Research Council funding and subsequent business per-
formance (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Bedu and Vanderstocken
2015; Von Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015; Criscuolo et al., 2016; Duch et al.,
2009; Doh and Kim, 2014; Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2014). Second, we
might anticipate stronger additionality for smaller firms where Re-
search Council funding may be more important in releasing financial
and other resource constraints (Becker, 2015). Third, additionality may
also be stronger in more technology intensive sectors where firms have
greater internal R&D resources and more capacity for collaborative
research or innovation with universities or other partners (Love et al.,
2011; Woerter and Roper, 2010; Rantisi, 2002; Petruzzelli, 2011;
Laursen and Salter, 2006; Bellucci et al., 2016).
3. Data and methodology
3.1. UK research councils and the gateway to research data
Our analysis covers the years 2006 to 2016, a period during which
there were significant changes in the UK innovation and industrial
policy landscape (Hildreth and Bailey, 2013). In England, Regional
Development Agencies (RDAs) with responsibility for promoting eco-
nomic development were established under the Labour government
between 1998 and 2002. The RDAs steadily accumulated responsi-
bilities and, post-2005, had a role in housing, tourism, transport, the
provision of business support, attracting inward investment, and pro-
viding a range of grants targeted at business improvement, develop-
ment and innovation in SMEs (Pearce and Ayres, 2009). The profile of
innovation supports provided by the RDAs varied by region, but typi-
cally included Innovation Vouchers, proof-of-concept funding and
support for commercialisation through schemes such as Grants for R&D
(subsequently renamed ‘Smart’). The RDAs were abolished by the
Coalition government in 2010–12 and replaced with more localised,
business-led, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) across England (Pike
et al., 2018). With the closure of the RDAs, delivery of a range of in-
novation support schemes for SMEs were transferred to the national
Technology Strategy Board (TSB). TSB itself had been established in
2007 to support applied R&D and business innovation by providing
grant support to businesses for single company or collaborative R&D
projects. After 2010 the number of awards provided by TSB rose rapidly
with an increasing focus on smaller firms. In 2014–15, TSB – by then
renamed Innovate UK – offered grant funding to 1401 projects of which
around 51 per cent involved university-industry collaboration
(Technology Strategy Board, 2015).9 Innovate UK grant support rates
vary depending on the focus of the project and firm size, but can be up
to 50 per cent for small firms. In addition to its role in providing grant
support for business R&D and innovation, TSB/Innovate UK has also
invested significantly since 2010 in the UK's Catapult network, colla-
borative initiatives to enable firms to access state of the art equip-
ment.10 One recent study suggests positive survival, turnover and em-
ployment benefits from Innovate UK support over the 2008–12 period
(Frontier Economics, 2017).
While the UK innovation policy landscape changed significantly
during our study period, there was more stability in the provision of
public funding for university R&D and collaborative basic research. The
UK's seven Research Councils11 vary in size, with the most significant in
terms of business impact being the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC) (Scandura, 2016). Originally established in
1994, towards the end of our study period EPSRC had an annual budget
of around £900m which is used to fund research (c. £700m) and
training and fellowship grants (c. £200m) (EPSRC, 2015). Individual
EPSRC research projects are university-led, often involving business
collaborators and are selected for funding on a competitive basis.
EPSRC funding is provided only to university partners, with business
partners either making financial or in-kind contributions (e.g. equip-
ment use or staff time) to a project. Evidence of the impact of EPSRC
support on participating firms is relatively limited although Scandura
(2016) provides evidence of input additionality in terms of both R&D
expenditure and employment two years after the end of EPSRC projects.
For our analysis we draw on funding and partnership data from the
Gateway to Research (GtR) website12 developed by the UK Research
Councils. GtR provides information on all publicly funded research
projects over the 2004 to 2016 period, including data from Innovate
UK, the seven Research Councils and the National Centre for the Re-
placement, Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research (NC3Rs).
GtR also provides information about approximately 34,000 organisa-
tions that participated in publicly-funded innovation and R&D projects,
including details on the number and value of funded projects, the
number and characteristics of partners, the topics and outcomes of the
research projects, the value of grants awarded per year, the Research
Council providing the funding, and information about each projects’
leaders.13 The GtR data relates solely to the public funding contribution
to each project and does not provide any indication of other financial
contributions by firms or other organisations. UK Research Councils
provide research funding through a wide range of schemes. The main
interventions are grants, university-industry (U-I) collaborations, fol-
lowed by training grants, fellowships, innovation vouchers and colla-
borative R&D projects. In most Research Council funded projects,
higher education institutions take the role of project coordinators,
while collaborators from national and international industry and other
organisations participate as non-funded partners. Innovate UK projects
aimed at the commercialisation of innovation operate differently, with
much of the funding going to private companies within and outside of
the UK. The focus of awards may also be very different across Research
Councils, from purely responsive mode where research councils have an
open call for high quality research ideas, to more strategic investments
which seek projects around a particular theme. Unfortunately, the da-
tabase reports only the projects successfully funded by Research
Councils, not allowing us to control for the selection and rationing
process.
A breakdown of the total number and value of projects supported by
the UK Research Councils over the period 2004–2016 by funding source
is provided in Table 1 and Fig. 1.14 Over 13 years the UK Research
Councils funded more than 70,000 research projects, allocating almost
£32 billion. The largest funders were the Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) supporting 22% of total projects
and allocating almost 30% of the overall funds available, followed by
the Medical Research Council - funding only 10% of the total number of
projects but accounting for more than 22% of the total value - and
9 In 2016, Innovate UK simplified its scheme portfolio focussing the majority
of support through a series of sectorally-focussed competitions for grant funding
(Innovate UK, 2016).
10 See https://catapult.org.uk.
11 That is the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), the
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), the
(footnote continued)
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the Medical Research Council (MRC), the
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).
12 We abstracted the data for this study between the 2nd and the 5th of
January 2017 from the Gateway to Research website available at the following
link: http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk.
13 The only public funding for R&D and innovation in the UK not included in
GtR regards support provided by the Regional Development Agencies prior to
2010, EU Framework Programmes and support provided by agencies in the
Devolved Territories as well as any contributions made by project partners.
14 See Table A3 in the appendix for variable definitions.
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Innovate UK responsible for the support of almost 20% of all projects
and allocating more than 15% of all resources.
The distribution of the number and value of projects funded by UK
Research Councils varies according to the type of participating orga-
nisation. As shown in Table 2, we categorised the 34,000 participating
organisations in 10 different categories: private firms, universities,
public research institutes, private R&D centres, schools, hospitals,
government authorities, charities, cultural organisations and others.15
The largest group of organisations is that of private firms, with more
than 14,500 firms participating in funded projects, followed by public
research institutes, universities and charities.
3.2. Firm-level data
In order to evaluate the “money to knowledge-knowledge to money”
effect of R&D grants awarded by the UKRCs, we matched the GtR data
with firm-level data from the ONS Business Structure Database (BSD),
accessed through the UK Data Service and covering the whole popu-
lation of businesses in the UK between 1997 and 2016 (ONS, 2017).16
The BSD provides information on firms’ age, ownership, turnover,
employment, industrial classification at the SIC 4-digit level and post-
code. We structured the longitudinal BSD data as a panel in order to
analyse the dynamic impact of public funded R&D on the performance
of participating firms, in particular in terms of employment and turn-
over growth. Using the Company Reference Numbers (CRNs) provided
in the GtR data, we have matched almost 10,000 UK firms who have
participated in publicly-funded research projects with the BSD dataset,
combining in this way information on project participation and firm-
level characteristics.17
Table 1
Breakdown of the total number and value of projects supported by UK Research
Councils over the period 2004–2016 by funding source.
Number Share Value (£m) Share
Tot. Projects 70, 178 100.0% 31,811 100.0%
AHRC 5585 8.0% 742 2.3%
BBSRC 11,208 16.0% 3750 11.8%
EPSRC 15,528 22.1% 9270 29.1%
ESRC 5675 8.1% 1930 6.1%
Innovate UK 13,870 19.8% 4920 15.5%
MRC 7250 10.3% 7190 22.6%
NC3Rs 248 0.4% 49 0.2%
NERC 6963 9.9% 2430 7.6%
STFC 3851 5.5% 1530 4.8%
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to research (GtR) data for the period
2004–2016. Value reported in £m. AHRC - Arts and Humanities Research
Council; BBSRC - Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council;
ESRC - Economic and Social Research Council; EPSRC - Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council; MRC - Medical Research Council; NERC -
Natural Environment Research Council; STFC - Science and Technology
Facilities Council; NC3Rs - National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement
and Reduction of Animals in Research.
Fig. 1. Total grants value per Research Council – all organisations and private
firms only.
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to research (GtR) data for the period
2004–2016. Grants value reported in millions of pounds.
Table 2
Number and average value of projects funded by UK Research Councils by
participants organisation type.
Firms Government Universities Pub.R&D
Inst.
Priv.R&
D Inst.
No. Organisations 14,854 747 543 847 68
Av. No. Partners 10.79 18.38 13.33 18.26 21.29
Av. Grant Value (£) 98,104 77,205 97,446 179,220 97,632
Av. No. Projects 2.40 6.14 109.77 9.00 18.40
Hospitals Schools Charities Cultural Org. Others
No. Organisations 423 256 1680 490 785
Av. No. Partners 133.43 15.22 23.75 15.34 20.12
Av. Grant Value (£) 93,292 123,422 114,484 32,315 165,318
Av. No. Projects 4.14 40.09 2.84 2.64 2.56
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to research (GtR) data for the period
2004–2016. Numbers reported are: average number of partners for each orga-
nisation type; average grant value (£); average number of projects per organi-
sation. Where projects are collaborative, project value is divided equally be-
tween participating organisations.
15 We define as others academic journals, associations, funds, membership
organisations and federations.
16 The annual BSD dataset is a live register of data based on the annual ab-
stracts from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) and collected by
HM Revenue and Customs via VAT and Pay As You Earn (PAYE) records cov-
ering the population of firms operating in the UK.
17 For the vast majority of UK firms (more than 80%) the GtR data provided
already the CRN number. For the remaining firms we have assigned manually a
CRN matching information from Bureau Van Dijk FAME database and the
Company House data based on names and full postcodes to distinguish between
multiple firms with the same name.
E. Vanino, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
6
3.3. Methodology
3.3.1. Application of propensity score matching to the GtR Data
As our earlier review of literature suggests, a significant hurdle in
the identification of the causal relationship between R&D grants and the
performance of participating firms is the possibility of endogeneity bias.
Specifically, participation in research projects is not an exogenous and
randomised treatment but is very likely to be affected by endogenous
factors influencing allocation decisions and the self-selection of firms
into this kind of programme.
To overcome this issue we apply a propensity score matching (PSM)
technique at the firm-level, as suggested in previous papers facing si-
milar empirical challenges (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki and
Licht, 2006; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; González and Pazó, 2008;
Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2014; Scandura, 2016), creating a suitable con-
trol group of non-treated firms which is as similar as possible to the
group of treated firms based on the likelihood of receiving the treat-
ment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). By using a PSM technique we aim
to control for the selection bias based on observable covariates by
comparing treated with comparable untreated firms, while taking into
account unobserved heterogeneity by comparing their differences in
performance growth before and after the treatment (Heckman et al.,
1997; Imbens, 2004).
Our identification strategy relies on comparing the performance of
participating firms before and after their participation in publicly-
funded projects compared to the performance of a control group of si-
milar but non-participating firms. Through the construction of a valid
control group based on the observable differences between participants
and non-participants, our matching approach should control for en-
dogeneity bias. The final step is to assess the average treatment effect
on the participating firms, the ATT effect, to estimate the difference in
the outcome variables between firms which participated in UKRCs
projects and firms which did not using a linear regression model as
developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2017).
Firms in our sample may have received RC-funded grants in any
year between 2006 and 2016, and although they may have participated
to more than one project, we focus on the impact of the first project in
order to better identify the causal effect of receiving public support
while getting rid of other externalities and learning processes occurring
during the implementation of a project (Scandura, 2016).18 19 Thus, we
build a new time variable t set equal to 0 for the year in which firms
participate in their first publicly-funded research project.20 We then
measure the average growth rate of the outcome variables yt n1+ , em-
ployment and turnover,21 as the difference between the pre-treatment
log level at time t-1 and the levels in the short-term (ST) 2 years after
the treatment, and in the medium-term (MT) 5 years after the
treatment.22 Since we are interested in identifying the differences in
firms’ performance after the participation in a research project, we can
express the average treatment effect (τATT) in terms of performance
growth after the start of the project at time t+ n as E y S( | 1)t n t1 =+ , and
the counterfactual performance growth for the same group of firms had
they not participated as E y S( | 1)t n t0 =+ :
E y y S E y S E y S( | 1) ( | 1) ( 1)ATT t n t n t t n t t n t
1 0 1 0= = = = =+ + + +
where S denotes the two groups of firms, S=1 is the treated group
participating in the project and S=0 is the untreated group. The fun-
damental problem is that only one of the two possible cases is observed
for each firm, i.e. whether the firm has participated in publicly funded
research projects E y S( | 1)t n t1 =+ or not E y S( | 0)t n t0 =+ . Hence, we need to
build a suitable control group by considering instead the effect of no
treatment on the performance growth of similar firms which did not
participate in funded research projects.
To build the control group we use a propensity score matching
technique in order to select suitable controls from the very large group
of untreated firms, matching observed characteristics as closely as
possible to those of treated firms before the start of the research project
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997; Becker and
Ichino, 2002; Lechner, 2002). We estimate the probability that any firm
participates in a publicly-funded research project, the so-called pro-
pensity score, based on a set of relevant observable characteristics
which have been found to influence the likelihood of participation in
the previous literature. We use a logit model with firm and year fixed-
effects to estimate the propensity score for all observations, using sev-
eral covariates which may explain the probability of participation. We
include a set of firm-level variables such as employment, employment
squared, turnover, firm age, employment and productivity growth in
the 2-years period before the projects have been awarded, firms market
share, group membership, foreign ownership and single-plant firm
dummies to control for firms’ characteristics, and the total number of
patents to control for firms’ previous innovation activities.23 In addi-
tion, we take into account whether firms are located in the same
postcode district as a science park, to control for the potential effect of
university spillovers, and the number of other R&D projects publicly-
funded by UK Research Councils within the same region and industry to
control for potential peer-effects (Lofsten and Lindelof 2002; Siegel
et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2009; Vasquez-Urriago et al., 2016).24 Sec-
ondly, we include other control variables at the industry-region level to
control for location and sector specific factors, such as the Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) agglomeration index per region and industry, the re-
gional R&D intensity,25 the region-industry competition level measured
with the net entry-exit rate, region-industry employment and turnover
per employee levels, and finally year, region (LEP or NUTS 2-digit level)
and industry (SIC 4-digit) dummies.
We estimate a separate propensity score for each sub-sample of
interest (see below), in order to take into account the heterogeneous
likelihood of being treated for firms with different characteristics. In
Table 4 we report the propensity score estimation results for the general
sample which is consistent with previous studies.26 In particular, large
and younger firms seem to be more likely to participate in research
projects funded by the RCs, especially if they are part of a business
18 The GtR data start from 2004, while our analysis starts from 2006. We thus
use the first two years of grants data to check if firms have been active in R&D
grants before the beginning of our period of analysis. As a robustness test, we
repeat the same analysis but starting from 2008, so using 4 years of GtR data to
check the previous history of firms’ participation in UKRC funded projects. The
results reported in Table 5 are very similar and robust across the two specifi-
cations.
19 As a robustness test, to relax the strong focus on the first grant and take into
consideration the effect of all grants received on firms’ performance, in Table 5
we also report the results of the analysis considering all grants received while
controlling for previous grant participation in the propensity score estimation.
The results are robust and consistent with our main specification.
20 For untreated firms included in the control group t=0 represents their
median year in the sample.
21 Due to the limited number of variables included in the BSD database, it is
not possible to estimate the impact of UKRC funded research projects on ad-
vanced measures of firms’ productivity, such as total factor productivity or
gross value added. Results considering the impact on labour productivity,
measured as turnover per employee, are available from the authors upon re-
quest.
22 Superscript 1 in yt n1+ indicates the participation to the project; n denotes the
number of years after the start of the project.
23 Data on firms’ patents was provided by the UK Intellectual Property Office.
24 Data about the location of science parks in the UK has been drawn from the
UK Science Park Association (UKSPA) website.
25 We have measured region and region-industry R&D intensity using data
from the UK CIS dataset (BIS-ONS, 2018) as the average ration between R&D
expenditure and turnover at the regional NUTS 2-digit level or at the regional
NUTS 2-digit and industry SIC 2-digit level.
26 Results of the propensity score estimations for all the other sub-samples are
similar and available upon request.
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group and are domestically-owned. In addition, firms’ market share and
previous patenting activity increase the likelihood of participation.
Firms located close to a science park and in a region-industry sur-
rounded by other participants to RC projects also have a higher prob-
ability of participating in RC-funded projects.
After estimating the probability of participating in a publicly-funded
research project, we proceed by matching the untreated and treated
observations according to their estimated propensity score. First, we
impose a common support condition, dropping the treated and un-
treated observations whose propensity scores are larger or smaller than
the maximum or minimum of the other category. Secondly, we apply a
Nearest-Neighbour matching technique with a strict Calliper band-
width, matching each treated observation only with the closest un-
treated observation within a 0.05 range in the propensity score. We
restrict the matching to firms located in the same region at the LEP or
NUTS 2–digit level and operating within the same sector at the SIC 4-
digit level. In addition, since the balancing test between the treated and
control group was not always completely satisfactory for some of the
control variables after the matching, we have implemented a coarsened
exact matching forcing the matching to be only between firms that are
both inside (or outside) of a science park, and have similar values in
terms of number of patents previously registered and of market share.
To test the sensitivity of the matching method, as a robustness check we
apply a Kernel matching technique with a strict bandwidth of 0.05,
using a kernel-weighted distribution which down-weights the con-
tribution to the outcome of non-treated firms which are further from
the propensity score of treated observations within a certain range.
Finally, we have clustered the standard errors following the Abadie and
Imbens (2011) methodology for the Nearest-Neighbour matching pro-
cedure to take into account the additional source of variability in-
troduced by the estimation of the propensity score (Heckman et al.,
1997).27
3.3.2. Results from our propensity score matching for the GtR data
After estimating the propensity score, dropping outliers and keeping
only firms which satisfy the common support condition, our final
sample contains almost 6000 UK firms participating in their first R&D
project funded by UKRCs and an equal number of similar untreated
firms included in the control group. Table 3 presents summary statistics
about the average grants value, projects characteristics, size and pro-
ductivity of firms in our sample by industrial classification.28 In addi-
tion, Figs. 2 and 3 report the distribution of the number of treated firms
and their average grant intensity across industries (SIC 2-digit) and
regions (NUTS 2-digit). The distribution of participating firms and their
grant intensity, measured as grant value divided by turnover, is dif-
ferent across industries and regions. For instance, manufacturing in-
dustries record the largest share of ‘treated’ firms, although in terms of
grant intensity the main ones are the machinery and professional ser-
vices sectors. Geographically, the distribution in Fig. 3 is more even
across regions, with higher shares of treated firms and grants intensity
in Oxfordshire, Cambridgeshire, the Bristol area, the Midlands and
around Edinburgh.
Table 4 reports the results of the balancing tests verifying the con-
sistency of the construction of the control group and the overall quality
of the matching procedure for the general sample of firms.29 To check
the propensity score balancing we report mean differences across the
treated and control group for the set of variables used to estimate the
propensity score after matching. Where differences between treated and
untreated firms were observed before matching, these are significantly
reduced after matching. The bias after matching for all covariates is
reduced below the 25% critical threshold, and the t-values for differ-
ences in the means are not significant, suggesting a consistent and ba-
lanced matching, and that there are no systematic differences in the
observable characteristics of treated and untreated firms before the
participation in publicly-funded research projects. This is confirmed
also in Fig. 4 which plots the time trends for the two main outcome
variables for the pre-project and treatment periods for all firms in our
Table 3
Summary statistics of treated firms by category.
General Manufacturing Services HT LT KIS Non-KIS
No. Firms 8943 2141 6802 1169 829 4309 2459
Tot. Value Grants (M £) 9000 1170 7820 968 1150 7180 640
Av. No. Projects 2.30 1.20 2.61 1.62 1.23 4.67 1.49
Av. Grant Value 74,223 43,917 82,793 66,199 46,084 150,086 13,722
Grant Intensity 4.04% 1.82% 4.98% 2.33% 1.93% 6.43% 0.92%
Av. No. Partners 23.96 16.25 26.14 22.38 16.76 43.50 8.32
Size 602 391 689 365 405 389 1550
Age 16 21 14 21 21 13 18
Lab. Productivity 4.444 4.827 4.284 4.853 4.805 4.049 4.947
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016 for UK based private firms before the
implementation of the matching algorithm. Total grants value reported in millions of pounds, average grant value in pounds. Grant intensity measured as value of
grants received over total turnover. Size measured in number of employees. Productivity is measured as turnover per employee. Manufacturing industry includes all
SIC (2003) sectors between 15 and 36, service industry from sector 37 to 95. Following the Eurostat definition, manufacturing high-tech firms have SIC codes (2003)
equal to: (24) chemicals and pharmaceuticals; (29) machinery and engines; (30) computers and office machinery; (31) electrical machinery; (32) IT and commu-
nication equipment; (33) medical, precision and optical instruments; (34) motor vehicles; (35) transport equipment. Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) include the
following sectors: (61) water transports; (62) air transports; (64) post and telecommunications; (65) financial intermediation; (66) insurance; (67) auxiliary activities
to financial intermediation; (70) real estate; (71) renting of machinery and equipment; (72) computer related activities; (73) research and development; (74) other
business activities; (80) education; (85) health and social work; (92) recreational, cultural and sporting activities.
27 Standard errors are instead bootstrapped with 500 repetitions for hetero-
scedasticity consistency when using the kernel matching algorithm.
28 Following the Eurostat classification, manufacturing high-tech firms have
SIC codes (2003) equal to: (24) chemicals and pharmaceuticals; (29) machinery
and engines; (30) computers and office machinery; (31) electrical machinery;
(32) IT and communication equipment; (33) medical, precision and optical
instruments; (34) motor vehicles; (35) transport equipment. Knowledge-in-
tensive services (KIS) include the following sectors: (61) water transports; (62)
air transports; (64) post and telecommunications; (65) financial intermediation;
(66) insurance; (67) auxiliary activities to financial intermediation; (70) real
estate; (71) renting of machinery and equipment; (72) computer related ac-
tivities; (73) research and development; (74) other business activities; (80)
education; (85) health and social work; (92) recreational, cultural and sporting
activities.
29 Balancing tests for all the other sub-samples of interest are similar and
available upon request.
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dataset. In the pre-project period, i.e. before the beginning of the UKRC
funded projects at time t=0, the outcome variables employment and
turnover exhibit very similar trends to the group of untreated firms.
Overall, the matching procedure satisfies the balancing property, sug-
gesting that the conditional independence assumption is not violated,
since yt n1+ and yt n0+ , respectively are statistically independent for firms
with the same set of exogenous characteristics (Rubin, 1977; Ro-
senbaum and Rubin, 1985; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Finally, we estimate a linear regression model following the Leuven
and Sianesi (2017) methodology on a pooled cross-sectional dataset
where for any given firm we observe the treatment dummy, the pro-
pensity score, the different control variables and the dependent vari-
ables of employment and turnover growth between period t−1 and the
short-term (t+2) and the medium term (t+5) periods. By matching
based on the propensity score and controlling for year and industry
fixed-effect, along with other control variables, we get a reliable esti-
mate of the impact of receiving RC-funded grants on participating firms.
However, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of this meth-
odology. First, despite being widely adopted in innovation policy re-
search because of its ability to deal with potential common support
problems, propensity score matching does not fully reduce the concerns
of unobservable factors explaining grant allocation and post-grant
performances. Second, this methodology cannot establish the impact of
the treatment beyond the eligible groups of treated and control ob-
servations included in the analysis, potentially biasing the estimation of
the overall economic effect if these groups are not representative of the
entire population.
4. Results and discussion
We exploit the richness of our dataset by investigating the hetero-
geneous impact of RC-funded research projects on the performance of
different groups of participating firms. First, we estimate the general
effect for the total sample of firms, providing several tests to corrobo-
rate the robustness of the results. Secondly, we explore the hetero-
geneous impact across different participating firms’ characteristics,
based on firms’ size and productivity, regional and industrial distribu-
tion. Third, we consider the effect of the characteristics of different RC-
funded projects on the performance of participating firms, specifically
considering the number and value of projects participated, and the
number and characteristics of participants. Finally, we disentangle the
effect of participating in projects funded by different RCs, analysing in
particular the evolution in the funding strategy of EPSRC and Innovate
UK and their implications for the performance of participating firms.
4.1. General effect and firm heterogeneity
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 show that participating in projects
funded by RCs has a positive impact on firms’ employment and turnover
growth in our general sample, both in the short and medium-term.
Employment grows on average 4.8% faster in treated firms in the 3
years following the award, and almost 21% in the medium-term.30
Turnover growth is also positively affected by participation, increasing
in the short-term by almost 7.6% and 23% in the medium-term. Overall,
RC-funded firms create around 150 new jobs more than untreated firms
in the control group 5 years after receiving publicly-funded R&D grants,
while increasing their turnover by almost £45 million more than un-
treated firms over the same period. These findings are in line with the
previous literature, explaining the larger effect in the medium-term due
to the time needed to develop new R&D activities after the start of a
research project and to commercially exploit the results of new in-
novations (Barajas et al., 2012; NESTA, 2012; Dimos and Pugh, 2016).
The results for our entire sample period are consistent with additional
tests where we focus our analysis only on the post-2008 period (col-
umns 3 and 4),31 are robust to using a kernel matching technique in-
stead of the Nearest-Neighbour method (columns 5 and 6) with very
similar marginal effects, and have consistent statistical significance
when considering not only first-time participants, but all RC-funded
grants received by firms over this period (columns 7 and 8).
Secondly, in Table 6 we analyse potential sector-specific patterns,
following the predictions of the conceptual framework, differentiating
between manufacturing and services firms,32 high-tech versus low-tech
manufacturing firms, and between knowledge intensive services (KIS)
and non-KIS companies. Overall, participation in RC-funded projects
has a similar effect on the employment growth of firms in both man-
ufacturing and services industries, increasing it by around 24% after 6
years. However, the impact on turnover growth is greater for manu-
facturing companies, increasing by almost 31% in the medium-term,
compared to only 19.5% in service firms. Differentiating between high-
tech/low-tech manufacturing firms and between KIS and non-KIS
companies, we find that the effects on employment are relatively si-
milar for high-tech compared with low-tech manufacturing firms, while
however the substantial effects on medium-term turnover growth,
Fig. 2. Industrial distribution of treated firms and their grants intensity.
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business
Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. Share of firms calculated
as the ratio between the number of participating firms over the total number of
firms in the industry at the SIC 2-digit level. Grant value intensity measured as
the average value of grants awarded per year over the industry total turnover.
30 Note that sample sizes for the medium-term comparisons are smaller than
those for the short-term comparisons as we do not have medium-term perfor-
mance data for firms starting their project later in the sample period.
31 As a robustness check in columns 3 and 4 we focus only on the post-2008
period in order to isolate any impact of learning-effects and to avoid the esti-
mation of effects related to the award of research grants received before 2004
and thus not observed in our data.
32 Manufacturing sectors includes all industries with a SIC (2003) code be-
tween 15 and 37. Services sector includes all industries with a SIC (2003) code
from 40 to 95.
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almost 30%, are only experienced by high-tech firms. This latter result
is similar to what might be anticipated on the basis of the previous
literature (Love et al., 2011; Bellucci et al., 2016). Participating firms in
KIS sectors benefit substantially more in terms of both short-term and
medium-term employment compared with those in non-KIS sectors,
25% versus 11% in the medium term, for example, while here turnover
growth effects are more balanced between the two groups of firms.
Overall, these results suggest that participation in publicly-funded
Fig. 3. Regional distribution of treated firms and their grants
intensity.
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the
Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016.
Share of firms calculated as the ratio between the number of
participating firms over the total number of firms in the region
at the NUTS 2-digit level. Grant value intensity measured as
the average value of grants awarded per year over the regional
total turnover.
Table 4
Propensity Score estimation and matching average balancing test.
Propensity Score Mean Bias t-test Var.
coeff. s.e. Treated Control Perc. t-value p-value Ratio
Employment 0.329*** (0.0048) 3.3542 3.3579 0.2 0.09 0.926 1.03
Lab. Prod. −0.0072 (0.0063) 4.3083 4.2899 1.7 0.59 0.557 1.27
Age −0.124*** (0.0093) 2.5405 2.5556 1.7 0.79 0.427 0.96
Empl. Growth 0.0183 (0.0229) 0.08357 0.08793 2 0.63 0.531 0.7
Lab. Prod. Growth 0.0246 (0.0165) 0.0299 0.03745 1.6 0.6 0.548 1.36
Group 0.178*** (0.0152) 0.35085 0.35511 1.1 0.33 0.738 .
Foreign Owned −0.143*** (0.0226) 0.06641 0.06996 1.9 0.53 0.597 .
Science Park 0.217*** (0.0149) 0.16371 0.17259 2.7 0.89 0.373 .
Aggl. Index 1.178* (0.666) 0.00631 0.00603 1.4 0.76 0.445 1
Reg. R&D Int. 0.0048 (0.0033) 8.9609 9.0199 2.7 1.01 0.313 0.99
Competition Index 0.306** (0.151) 0.05595 0.05547 0.3 0.34 0.735 1.01
Reg-Ind. Lab. Prod. −0.0324 (0.0227) 4.7163 4.7151 0.2 0.09 0.93 0.97
Reg-Ind. Empl. −0.0976*** (0.0116) 9.8927 9.8784 0.9 0.33 0.744 1.05
Market Share 0.878*** (0.130) 0.01648 0.0151 2.8 0.68 0.494 1.04
Peer Effect 0.0008*** (0.0001) 54.404 55.589 1.1 0.74 0.457 0.88
Single Plant 0.0124 (0.0150) 0.47124 0.45597 3.4 1.15 0.251 .
Tot. Patents 0.275*** (0.0179) 0.09633 0.10144 1.6 0.35 0.729 0.68
R^2 LR-chi^2 p.chi^2 Mean Bias Med. Bias B R Treated Untreated
0.001 6.69 0.987 1.7 1.6 6.9 0.86 5662 5662
Notes: The second and third columns report the results of the propensity score estimation using a logit model. Robust standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Columns 4 and 5 present the mean value of each control variable for firms in the treated and control groups after the
implementation of the matching technique. In column 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates included in the logit estimation after the
matching procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values between treated and untreated firms in the matched sample. Column 9
shows the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of the propensity score in treated group. The bottom row presents a summary of statistics regarding
the whole sample: the pseudo R2 from the logit estimation and the corresponding X2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint significance of covariates; the
mean and median bias as summary indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples; the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardised difference of means of
linear index of propensity score in treated and matched non-treated groups, while the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the
propensity score index. Finally, the total number of treated and control observations in the support sample is included.
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research projects has a positive effect even on the performance of firms
in sectors with low average R&D intensity, however only in the medium
term.
This evidence is confirmed by the results in Table 7 where we
analyse the impact of participating in RC-funded projects for firms
across the distribution of industry and region-industry R&D intensity.
Note that the positive effect on the employment growth of participating
firms is significant regardless of the industry R&D intensity, with si-
milar magnitudes across the four quartiles of the distribution, and
similarly so for the medium-term effect across the region-industry dis-
tribution, while only the least R&D-intensive sectors record a short-term
employment boost. However, we find evidence that the positive effect
on turnover growth is much larger for firms operating in the most,
compared with the least, R&D intensive regions and industries, in-
creasing their total revenue due to RC support in the short-run by al-
most 22% and in the medium-term up to 32% (Table 7, Panel 2, 4th
quartile). We also observe that regional peer effects are important for
the least R&D intensive industries, in particular with regard to turnover
Fig. 4. Employment and turnover trends for treated and untreated firms before and after the beginning of the UKRC
funded projects (t=0).
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period
2004–2016. Average value of employment and turnover for treated observations reported up to 8 years before and after
the treatment year t= 0 and the median year in the sample for untreated observations. The average standard deviation
for employment for treated observations is equal to 217.28, for untreated observations 125.14. The average standard
deviation for turnover for treated observations is equal to 1.426, for untreated observations 1.303.
Table 5
Impact of participation in publicly-funded research on UK firms’ performance – General sample and robustness.
General After 2008 General - Kernel All Grants
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0483*** 0.207*** 0.0644*** 0.231*** 0.0642*** 0.171*** 0.0071*** 0.0562***
(0.0101) (0.0196) (0.00907) (0.0206) (0.0071) (0.0121) (0.0012) (0.0112)
Turnover 0.0763*** 0.231*** 0.0569** (0.0180) 0.0892*** 0.252*** 0.0098*** 0.0431***
(0.0182) (0.0371) 0.221*** (0.0376) (0.0173) (0.0299) (0.0002) (0.0087)
No. Treated 5662 3668 4391 2425 5662 3668 18762 10,911
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses for the Nearest-Neighbour matching, while
bootstrapped standard errors for the Kernel matching. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-
term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
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growth effects. These results suggest that RC-funded projects allow
firms to expand their operations and to hire new employees regardless
of their R&D intensity. However, firms in R&D intensive sectors may be
better able to capitalise on the results of the publicly-funded research in
terms of total sales in the medium-term, highlighting the role of internal
absorptive capacity in converting public money to knowledge and then
into new sales and profits (Woerter and Roper, 2010; Petruzzelli, 2011).
Finally, as suggested by previous studies, the impact of public-
funded R&D projects on firms’ performance may also vary depending on
other firm characteristics (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Dimos
and Pugh, 2016; Bellucci et al., 2016; Cin et al., 2017). We therefore
evaluate the impact of participation on the performance of firms across
the size and productivity distribution of treated and untreated firms in
Table 8.33 It is evident that, as suggested by Becker (2015), smaller and
Table 6
Impact of participation in publicly-funded research on UK firms’ performance – Manufacturing and services industries.
Manufacturing Manuf. - HT Manuf. – LT
ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0379* 0.239*** 0.0370* 0.205*** 0.0140 0.212***
(0.0176) (0.0363) (0.0179) (0.0537) (0.0290) (0.0631)
Turnover 0.0607 0.306*** 0.0670 0.229** 0.0412 0.182
(0.0349) (0.0616) (0.0410) (0.0748) (0.0462) (0.103)
No. Treated 1565 1103 923 677 622 411
Services KIS Non-KIS
ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0518*** 0.240*** 0.0697*** 0.253*** 0.0329 0.114**
(0.0104) (0.0214) (0.0121) (0.0244) (0.0204) (0.0428)
Turnover 0.0416 0.195*** 0.0664* 0.137** 0.0196 0.157*
(0.0215) (0.0430) (0.0264) (0.0506) (0.0326) (0.0631)
No. Treated 3984 2492 2880 1813 1094 670
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Manufacturing industry includes all SIC (2003) sectors between 15 and 36, service industry from sector 37
to 95. Following the Eurostat definition, manufacturing high-tech firms have SIC codes (2003) equal to: (24) chemicals and pharmaceuticals; (29) machinery and
engines; (30) computers and office machinery; (31) electrical machinery; (32) IT and communication equipment; (33) medical, precision and optical instruments;
(34) motor vehicles; (35) transport equipment. Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) include the following sectors: (61) water transports; (62) air transports; (64) post
and telecommunications; (65) financial intermediation; (66) insurance; (67) auxiliary activities to financial intermediation; (70) real estate; (71) renting of ma-
chinery and equipment; (72) computer related activities; (73) research and development; (74) other business activities; (80) education; (85) health and social work;
(92) recreational, cultural and sporting activities. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
Table 7
Impact of participation in publicly-funded research on UK firms’ performance across the distribution of region-industry R&D intensity (quartiles).
Industry R&D Intensity
1 st 2nd 3rd 4th
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0352* 0.190*** 0.0613** 0.252*** 0.0643** 0.312*** 0.0722*** 0.269***
(0.0141) (0.0324) (0.0216) (0.0572) (0.0251) (0.0497) (0.0170) (0.0367)
Turnover 0.00764 0.221 0.116* 0.299** 0.0268 0.201* 0.149*** 0.302***
(0.0308) (0.123) (0.0465) (0.0931) (0.0470) (0.0800) (0.0393) (0.0695)
No. Treated 1964 1182 850 548 1013 658 1352 933
Region-Industry Peer Effect
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0512*** 0.209*** 0.0377 0.212*** 0.0288 0.210*** 0.00425 0.197**
(0.0101) (0.0239) (0.0231) (0.0446) (0.0225) (0.0494) (0.0324) (0.0681)
Turnover 0.0647** 0.187*** 0.0121 0.258** 0.101* 0.238* 0.220*** 0.322*
(0.0220) (0.0412) (0.0388) (0.0785) (0.0478) (0.0930) (0.0655) (0.156)
No. Treated 1447 1105 1461 903 1457 923 1248 694
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. R&D intensity calculated at the industry
(SIC 2) and region-industry (NUTS2-SIC2) level using UK CIS data as average ratio between R&D expenditure and total turnover. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
33 In terms of scale, we grouped firms according to their initial level of em-
ployment at time t-1, categorising firms into micro (with 10 or less employees),
small (between 10 and 50 employees), medium (between 50 and 250 em-
ployees) and large enterprises (more than 250 employees). In terms of pro-
ductivity we grouped firms in four different quartiles according to the dis-
tribution of firms’ labour productivity (turnover per employee) at time t-1.
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less productive participating firms experience the largest performance
benefits in relation to their untreated counterparts. The impact seems to
be particularly large for the least productive companies in our sample,
which, 6 years after the award, register an employment growth 30%
faster than untreated firms and an increase in turnover by more than
40% (Table 8, Panel 2, 1st quartile). Instead there is almost no statis-
tical difference in employment and turnover growth between treated
and untreated large firms with more than 250 employees.
4.2. UKRC projects’ heterogeneity
4.2.1. Number of projects, number of project partners and characteristics of
project participants
We now focus on the effect of different project characteristics on the
performance of participating firms. In particular, we consider the
number of projects in which firms participated, the number and char-
acteristics of participants, and the value of project grants.
Table 8
Impact of participation in innovation grants on performance across the size and productivity (turnover per employee) distribution of treated and untreated firms
(quartiles).
Scale Distribution
Micro Small Medium Large
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0822*** 0.279*** 0.0586*** 0.254*** 0.0676*** 0.261*** 0.0121 0.0820
(0.0115) (0.0249) (0.0156) (0.0338) (0.0192) (0.0429) (0.0348) (0.0561)
Turnover 0.0744** 0.228*** 0.0902** 0.341*** 0.0811* 0.282*** 0.0739 0.164
(0.0287) (0.0577) (0.0328) (0.0644) (0.0399) (0.0783) (0.0643) (0.0898)
No. Treated 2191 1243 1559 945 986 696 864 731
Productivity Distribution
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0732*** 0.302*** 0.0275 0.177*** 0.0455* 0.258*** 0.0323 0.192***
(0.0193) (0.0392) (0.0217) (0.0430) (0.0200) (0.0501) (0.0166) (0.0324)
Turnover 0.143** 0.400*** 0.0428 0.138* 0.0255 0.187* 0.00914 0.113
(0.0497) (0.0947) (0.0305) (0.0625) (0.0373) (0.0763) (0.0398) (0.0653)
No. Treated 1360 824 1344 827 1166 762 1539 1072
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Micro (with 10 or less employees), small (between 10 and 50 employees), medium (between 50 and
250 employees) and large enterprises (more than 250 employees). Firms grouped in four different quartiles according to the distribution of firms’ labour productivity
(turnover per employee) at time t-1. Short-term refers to growth between t-1 and t+ 2, medium-term between t-1 and t+ 5.
Table 9
Impact of participation in innovation grants on firms’ performance for single-grant and serial-grant participants.
Single Grant Serial Grant Remove Outliers
ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0480*** 0.198*** 0.0846*** 0.298*** 0.0641*** 0.201***
(0.00930) (0.0194) (0.0165) (0.0326) (0.0215) (0.097)
Turnover 0.0296 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.366*** 0.0491** 0.188***
(0.0188) (0.0372) (0.0358) (0.0616) (0.0232) (0.0521)
No. Treated 4678 2948 1647 1337 5479 3581
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5. Single
Grant participants are firms which participated in only one project during the sample period either as leader or a project partner. Serial Grant participants parti-
cipated in more than one project either as leader or a project partner.
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First, in Table 9 we look at the number of RC-funded projects in
which firms participated during our sample period, differentiating be-
tween single project participants, the majority of firms in our sample,
and serial-project participants. Single-project participants are firms
which participated – as either leader or partner – in only one project
during the sample period. Serial project participants participated – as
either leader or partner – in at least one additional project. As expected,
we find a stronger positive impact for serial-project participants, in-
creasing their size by almost 30% and their turnover by 36% 6 years
after the beginning of their first RC-funded project. However, note from
the first two columns in Table 9 that the positive effect of publicly-
funded research is also highly significant for firms participating in only
a single research project, except for short-term turnover growth. This
highlights the benefits of publicly-funded R&D for firms not repeatedly
involved in such projects. By increasing the funding available and the
scope of these projects to include new entrants, it would be possible to
foster the growth of a larger number of firms. This could also lay the
basis for more firms to form partnerships that may continue to provide
benefits beyond the (initial) RC grant, and for these firms to potentially
develop into ‘serial’ project participants themselves. In addition, in the
last two columns of Table 9, we test the robustness of our results to
outliers by removing from our general sample the firms in the top
percentile of the number-of-projects distribution.34 The results are si-
milar to the estimations for the general sample presented in Table 5.
Secondly, in Table 10, we consider the impact that the number of
partners in each RC-funded project might have on the performance of
participating firms. According to previous contributions, larger R&D
projects could have a more positive impact on the performance of
participating firms, mainly by increasing the opportunities for learning
from partners, which could improve the R&D project output and sub-
sequently firms’ growth (Belderbos et al., 2004; Okamuro, 2007).
However, too large a number of partners could also have a dampening
impact on the outcome of the R&D collaboration, increasing uncertainty
and the cost of coordination, monitoring and control (Morandi, 2013).
Our results in Table 10 suggest that the number of partners in RC-
funded projects is not relevant for the employment performance of
participating firms, since the ATTs are always positive and statistically
significant across the quartile distribution of the number of partners
and not statistically different from each other. More partners seems to
have some beneficial influence only on turnover growth.
Table 11
Impact of participation in innovation grants on firms’ performance for projects with or without foreign partners and foreign leaders.
Foreign Leader Domestic Leader No Foreign Partners
ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0550 0.223** 0.0594*** 0.229*** 0.0480*** 0.233***
(0.0356) (0.0724) (0.00987) (0.0188) (0.00989) (0.0213)
Turnover 0.148 0.398** 0.0782*** 0.238*** 0.0514* 0.209***
(0.0583) (0.134) (0.0182) (0.0362) (0.0202) (0.0412)
No. Treated 332 201 5237 3464 4212 2574
Foreign Partners Foreign Firm Partner Other Foreign Partner
ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0500** 0.239*** 0.0511** 0.188*** 0.0452 0.332***
(0.0181) (0.0333) (0.0219) (0.0423) (0.0314) (0.0534)
Turnover 0.0596 0.315*** 0.0740 0.316*** 0.0337 0.336***
(0.0320) (0.0625) (0.0404) (0.0810) (0.0578) (0.0975)
No. Treated 1442 1086 906 647 508 419
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
Table 10
Impact of participation in innovation grants on firms’ performance across the distribution of project number of partners (quartiles).
No. Partners Distribution
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0476*** 0.174*** 0.0821*** 0.225*** 0.0458** 0.242*** 0.0952*** 0.269***
(0.0143) (0.0334) (0.0168) (0.0354) (0.0160) (0.0344) (0.0189) (0.0336)
Turnover 0.0401 0.0888 0.0715* 0.261*** 0.0395 0.332*** 0.143*** 0.287***
(0.0301) (0.0684) (0.0358) (0.0660) (0.0341) (0.0636) (0.0376) (0.0669)
No. Treated 1648 700 1300 876 1469 1119 1213 964
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
34 Firms in the top percentile of the number-of-projects distribution have
participated in more than 7 and up to 85 projects during our sample period.
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It could be argued that it is not the number of partners per se, but
their characteristics which influence the performance of firms partici-
pating in RC-funded projects (Du et al., 2014; Hewitt-Dundas et al.,
2017). Therefore, in Tables 11 and 12 we investigate the heterogeneous
impact of different partners’ characteristics on the performance of
participating firms. Table 11 considers the ATTs in situations where
firms participated in RC-funded projects together with foreign partners
or only with domestic partners, and whether a domestic or a foreign
partner was the project lead. It is well known from the international
business literature, that foreign firms are typically more technologically
advanced and exhibit higher productivity than domestic firms. Since
most foreign partners in RC-funded projects during our sample period
were firms, we might expect better performance from projects with
foreign involvement. However, the increased complexity and cost of
coordination in the interaction with foreign partners, especially when
the leader of the project is geographically and organisationally distant
from domestic participants, and from the providers of the R&D support,
could combine to hold back performance (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003;
Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009; D’Este et al., 2013).35 About 25% of the
treated firms in our sample participated in RC-funded projects that
involved one or more foreign partners. The performance effect with
regard to employment are relatively similar for domestic firms which
collaborate with foreign partners compared with firms which collabo-
rate with domestic partners only. However, medium-term turnover
growth effects are larger from domestic-foreign collaborations, about
21% versus 31.5%. Interestingly, a similar difference in medium-term
turnover growth performance can be observed between foreign-led
versus domestic-led projects. In the short-term however, foreign-led
projects seem to exert no performance benefits, while domestic-led
projects increase employment and turnover growth by about 6% and
8%, respectively. So generally, with regard to turnover growth over a
medium-term horizon, external knowledge introduced by foreign
partners and leaders seems to be conducive to better performance for
participating domestic firms.
4.2.2. Project partners’ industry relatedness and projects’ grant value
Related to the previous point, we next examine the potential im-
portance of industry relatedness between project partners. We follow
the methodology proposed by Neffke et al. (2011) and use spatial co-
occurrence between sectors at the SIC 5-digit level as a measure of
firms’ industrial relatedness (Jaffe, 1989).36 Table 12 shows that the
positive impact of participation in RC-funded projects on employment,
and particularly on turnover, growth is larger as firms’ industrial re-
latedness with their project partners increases. For instance, the em-
ployment growth after 6 years from the beginning of the research
project increases from 18% to 23% moving from the bottom to the top
quartile of the industrial relatedness distribution, while from 11% to
24% in terms of turnover growth. Therefore, closer industrial related-
ness between project partners improves the growth outcomes of re-
search projects for firms. Industry coherence, rather than diversity,
seems to magnify the positive effects of RC support (Sakakibara, 2001;
Von Raesfeld et al., 2012; D’Este et al., 2013; Von Beers and Zand,
2014).
Finally, we contribute to the existing literature by considering the
continuous treatment effect of RC grant value on firms’ growth.
Information about grant or subsidy value is often not available in in-
novation and R&D data sources, and so the impact of the amount of
grant or subsidy support, compared with the question of whether or not
support was received, remains under-researched. To do so, we follow
the Hirano and Imbens (2005) methodology generalising the binary
treatment propensity score approach for continuous treatment vari-
ables. First, we estimate a generalised propensity score focusing only on
the sample of treated firms based on the amount of the grant received,
using the same control variables employed in the binary treatment
propensity score estimation.37 After checking the adequacy of the
propensity score estimation and the balance of all covariates across
treatment intervals, we estimate the dose–response function, averaging
Table 12
Impact of participation in innovation grants on firms’ performance across the distribution of firms’ industrial closeness with other project partners (quartiles).
Partners Industrial Closeness
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0386*** 0.183*** 0.0392*** 0.193*** 0.0563*** 0.209*** 0.0607*** 0.229***
(0.0117) (0.0277) (0.0113) (0.0258) (0.0119) (0.0292) (0.0115) (0.0270)
Turnover 0.0349 0.116* 0.0396 0.187*** 0.0601* 0.209*** 0.0714** 0.239***
(0.0232) (0.0487) (0.0240) (0.0483) (0.0244) (0.0508) (0.0236) (0.0503)
No. Treated 1430 815 1341 777 1440 852 1405 805
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. Industrial closeness estimated following
the Neffke et al. (2011) methodology using relatedness between each pair of sectors based on co-occurrence analysis by Jaffe (1989). ATT effect estimated using a
propensity score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05. The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and
t+5.
35 If foreign partner involvement in a project were to increase exports and
hence market size, this might also have a positive effect on performance (e.g.
Peters et al., 2018). However, firms that collaborate only with domestic part-
ners in RCUK-funded projects may of course also be exporters as part of their
wider operations.
36 We first estimate industrial relatedness between each pair of sectors s and j
using BSD data on the population of UK firms (ONS, 2017) and co-occurrence
analysis started by Jaffe (1989) and broadly developed since (Teece et al., 1994;
Hidalgo et al., 2007; Bryce and Winter, 2009). Specifically, we investigate the
frequency with which firms in industries s and j co-locate in the same regions,
relative to all other industries, using a cosine index. Co-occurrence analysis
measures the relatedness between two industries by assessing whether two
industries are often found together in the same economic entity. The assump-
tion made is that the frequency by which two industries are jointly located in
the same regions can be interpreted as a sign of the strength of their relation-
ship, in terms of production processes and technologies adopted, input-output
linkages and skills required. After calculating the relatedness between each pair
of industries, we estimate a measure of industrial closeness of a firm to the rest
of the project's partners, and thus create an indicator function that takes the
value of 1 if the relatedness between the firm and each other partner in the
project is above the mean, and a value of 0 otherwise. We then calculate the
ratio of close relations over the total number of possible relations in the project.
37 Results of the continuous propensity score estimation and of its balancing
test are available upon request.
E. Vanino, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
15
the estimated regression function over the score function evaluated at
different levels of the treatment. In this way, we are able to evaluate if
the relative grant size, measured as the ratio between the grant value
over total turnover before the treatment, has an impact on firms’ em-
ployment and turnover growth.
In Fig. 5, we report the marginal effect for each decile of the grant
ratio distribution, along with the 95% confidence intervals, finding a
positive and significant effect of the relative size of grants on employ-
ment and turnover growth, with an average magnitude in line with the
results estimated in our general sample. In particular, we find that
Fig. 5. Continuous treatment effect of grants value on firms’ performance.
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure at each decile of the grants rate distribution. Abadie and Imbens (2011). 95% Confidence intervals reported as dotted
lines.. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5. Grant ratio is measured as grants total value over firms’ turnover
to take into account the size of the grant in respect to the size of the firm. The sample of treated firms included in the analysis is the same as in the general estimation
sample in Table 5 (ST: 5662; MT: 3668).
Table 13
Impact of participation in publicly-funded projects awarded by EPSRC, Innovate UK, MCR and all the remaining UK research councils.
EPSRC Innovate UK MRC Other RCs
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0618** 0.242*** 0.0437*** 0.165*** 0.0556 0.317*** 0.0198 0.232***
(0.0239) (0.0428) (0.0102) (0.0204) (0.0472) (0.0748) (0.0302) (0.0568)
Turnover 0.163*** 0.266*** 0.0353* 0.175*** 0.156 0.230 0.00653 0.179
(0.0441) (0.0741) (0.0198) (0.0388) (0.117) (0.170) (0.0592) (0.110)
No. Treated 931 723 4160 2471 199 172 426 291
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
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UKRCs support has a positive and statistically significant effect on
employment and turnover growth only in the case of projects above the
first two deciles of the relative grants size distribution. Thus, small
grants relative to the firm size do not affect firms’ performance, while
relatively larger grants seem to have an increasingly positive effect on
the employment and turnover growth. This evidence is in line with our
previous results, as small and medium firms receiving relatively larger
grants are more likely to experience employment and turnover growth
as a consequence of the UKRC support, in respect to large firms for
which relatively smaller grants might be less effective. In fact, treated
firms in the top five deciles of the relative grant size distribution are
usually small firms with an average initial employment below 50 em-
ployees, which manage to create around 20 new jobs 5 years after
receiving large UKRCs-funded grants relative to their size, but very
small grants in absolute terms. Similarly, the same firms starting with
turnover below £2.5m scale-up very quickly thanks to relatively large R
&D grants funded by RCs in respect to their initial size, increasing their
turnover by almost £750,000 over a 5-year period. At the other end of
the scale, grants which are large in absolute scale but small relative to
the size of large firms with more than 250 employees have no sig-
nificant effect on the employment and turnover growth.
Table 14
Impact of participation in publicly-funded projects awarded by EPSRC and Innovate UK across firms’ size distribution.
EPSRC
Micro Small Medium Large
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.141*** 0.440*** 0.0630** 0.250** 0.0232 0.228* 0.00593 0.0388
(0.0402) (0.0659) (0.0301) (0.0894) (0.0451) (0.0955) (0.0444) (0.0867)
Turnover 0.248* 0.469** 0.249** 0.366* 0.0519 0.382* 0.0330 −0.110
(0.0975) (0.180) (0.0866) (0.152) (0.0912) (0.152) (0.0784) (0.141)
No. Treated 219 160 216 171 234 176 260 214
Innovate UK
Micro Small Medium Large
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0782*** 0.216*** 0.0376* 0.230*** −0.0375 0.115* −0.0125 0.168*
(0.0121) (0.0284) (0.0167) (0.0415) (0.0340) (0.0600) (0.0449) (0.0721)
Turnover 0.0516** 0.217*** 0.0738* 0.281*** 0.0124 0.0576 −0.0195 0.147
(0.0287) (0.0589) (0.0331) (0.0746) (0.0460) (0.0960) (0.0598) (0.0981)
No. Treated 1816 962 1186 650 611 403 416 346
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016. ATT effect estimated using a propensity
score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The
number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5. Micro (with
10 or less employees), small (between 10 and 50 employees), medium (between 50 and 250 employees) and large enterprises (more than 250 employees).
Table 15
Impact of participation in publicly-funded projects awarded by Innovate UK
and collaborations with universities.
No University Partner University Partner
ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0387* 0.212*** 0.0475*** 0.166***
(0.0190) (0.0396) (0.0108) (0.0251)
Turnover 0.0651 0.301*** 0.0442 0.146**
(0.0375) (0.0723) (0.0227) (0.0479)
No. Treated 1239 876 2816 1488
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business
Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016 for UK firms participating
to Innovate UK funded projects. ATT effect estimated using a propensity score
nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard
errors (s.e.) reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers
to growth between t−1 and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5. Fig. 6. Trend in the number of firms and the share of SMEs supported byInnovate UK.
Notes: Statistics based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business
Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016 for UK firms participating
to Innovate UK funded projects. Share of SMEs calculated as the number of
SMEs (less than 250 employees) over the total number of firms funded by
Innovate UK. Minimum number of firms in 2004 equal to 74.
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4.3. UK research councils heterogeneity
4.3.1. Projects funded by innovate UK compared with the Engineering and
Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)
Our data also allow us to analyse the effectiveness of research
projects funded by different UK Research Councils in accelerating the
growth of participating firms. We focus our attention mainly on the
grants awarded by the two main bodies responsible for the largest part
of grants involving private firms: Innovate UK and the Engineering and
Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC). The performance impact
on firms participating in R&D projects supported by these two bodies
could differ systematically from each other given the different focus and
target of their policy intervention. Innovate UK provides support to
private firms with a focus on reducing R&D risks, enabling and sup-
porting business innovation and the commercialization of R&D outputs.
By contrast, the EPSRC focuses mainly on the support of universities’
basic and applied research, i.e. well before the commercialization phase
of innovation, and extends only to private firms which collaborate with
funded universities in University-Industry (U-I) partnerships.
Table 13 distinguishes between firms involved in projects funded by
the EPSRC, Innovate UK, the Medical Research Council (MRC), and by
the remaining RCs. Most of the treated companies received support
from Innovate UK, more than 4000, while EPSRC-supported U-I colla-
borations involved about 900 of the firms in our sample. Firms involved
in projects funded by EPSRC seem to benefit strongly in terms of both
employment and turnover growth, increasing their scale by 24% in
respect to comparable non-treated firms six years after the start of the
project, while experiencing turnover growth by 26% after 6 years.
Firms supported by Innovate UK experience smaller short-term and
medium-term performance gains, both in terms of employment and
turnover. Significant employment growth effects are limited to the
medium-term only in the case of research projects supported by the
MRC.38 Finally, we also find a positive effect on medium -term em-
ployment growth only for projects supported by the remaining RCs.
These heterogeneous effects across UKRCs could also be driven by
the participating firms’ size. Focusing on the two main RCs supporting
private firms, EPSRC and Innovate UK, in Table 14 we find that in both
cases, the effects on employment and turnover growth are much larger
overall for micro and small firms, with particularly strong impacts of
44–46% from EPSRC-funded projects 6 years after the beginning of the
research project.
In Table 15 we further explore the heterogeneity of the EPSRC and
Innovate UK by disentangling the effects of Innovate UK-funded U-I
projects that, as all EPSRC-funded projects, involved a university
partner versus Innovate UK projects that did not involve a university.
Approximately 67% of our sample's Innovate UK-funded firms part-
nered with a university. Contrary to expectations we find larger ATTs
for both employment and turnover growth in the short and medium-
term for firms participating in Innovate UK projects which do not in-
volve a university partner. One possibility is that these non-university
Innovate UK projects are closer to market than those involving uni-
versities, and this is leading to stronger commercial impacts on parti-
cipating firms in the short and medium terms. It is difficult from our
data, however, to identify the precise nature of the R&D being con-
ducted as part of any specific project so this interpretation remains
somewhat speculative.
4.3.2. Evolution of innovate UK funding after the regional development
agencies
Finally, we focus our attention on projects supported by Innovate
UK in order to analyse the dynamic evolution of its funding strategy
especially after the abolition of the Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) in 2012. As discussed in Section 3 and documented in Fig. 6, a
range of innovation support schemes were transferred to Innovate UK
after 2012, shifting its focus towards the support of SMEs. The SME
share in the total number of supported firms rose to an average of al-
most 90% between 2013 and 2015. Therefore, in Table 16 we test
whether the shift in the funding strategy of Innovate UK in 2012 had
any effect on the performance of supported SMEs. Specifically, we
compare the impact on the performance of SMEs supported by Innovate
UK before and after 2012, relative to comparable unsupported firms in
these two periods. Both before and after 2012, supported SMEs ex-
perienced faster employment and turnover growth in both the short and
medium term. While there is no statistically significant difference be-
tween the two periods for the short-run employment effects and the size
of the medium-term employment effect, the impact on turnover growth
was much more significant statistically before the policy shift. How-
ever, comparing the group of supported SMEs with their large firm
counterparts in the last four columns in Table 16, we see that SMEs
achieved significantly stronger performance improvements than sup-
ported large firms after the shift in Innovate UK policy in 2012, while
there were no differences between the two groups before. This evidence
clearly indicates that the shift in Innovate UK focus after 2012 had a
significant impact on the performance of supported firms, increasingly
Table 16
Impact of participation in publicly-funded projects awarded by Innovate UK for SMEs before and after RDA termination in 2012.
SMEs Only SMEs v Large
Pre 2012 Post 2012 Pre 2012 Post 2012
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Employment 0.0751*** 0.115** 0.0416** 0.0817*** −0.0376 −0.0581 0.163*** 0.165**
(0.0158) (0.0355) (0.0132) (0.0243) (0.0743) (0.0916) (0.0416) (0.0802)
Turnover 0.247*** 0.373*** 0.156*** 0.0566 −0.004 −0.0628 0.142* 0.0348
(0.0280) (0.0523) (0.0354) (0.0659) (0.0889) (0.174) (0.0624) (0.113)
No. Treated 1425 1381 2270 718 1079 1057 1618 256
Notes: Estimation based on Gateway to Research (GtR) and the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period 2004–2016 for UK firms participating to Innovate
UK funded projects. ATT effect estimated using a propensity score nearest-neighbour matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2011) standard errors (s.e.) reported
in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The number of firms included in the treated group is reported. Short-term refers to growth between t−1
and t+2, medium-term between t−1 and t+5.
38 One tentative reason could be that the objective of much of the MRC-
funded research will likely be to discover and test new drugs. Hence due to its
nature, the research process may take longer, while the required long testing
process, as well as potential patent applications, before the outcomes of the
research are placed into the public domain and hence commercialised, may also
imply that performance effects, in particular on turnover growth, may take
longer to materialise. While currently out of reach in our sample period, one
might conjecture that long-run effects may be stronger.
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targeting at a larger number of SMEs, and fostering the innovativeness
and economic growth for a broader sample of smaller firms.
5. Conclusions
Over the last decade UK Research Councils have invested more than
£3bn pa in supporting R&D and innovation projects. To date, assess-
ments of the impact of this public investment have been partial, often
relying on limited information in innovation surveys or focused on
specific Research Councils. In this study for the first time we provide a
comprehensive assessment of UK public support for R&D and innova-
tion, assessing the impact of participation in publicly-funded research
grants on the performance of UK firms. Our analysis is based on data on
all R&D and innovation projects funded by UK Research Councils over
the 2004 to 2016 period taken from the Gateway to Research database
and firm-level data from the Business Structure Database. We apply a
propensity score matching technique to evaluate the performance of UK
firms who participated in publicly-funded R&D and innovation grants
compared to a matched comparator group which received no support.
Our analysis suggests four main conclusions which prove robust
across a range of different estimation methods and techniques. First,
firms involved in UKRC-funded projects grew around 6% faster in the
short-term and 22% in the medium-term than similar firms which did
not participate to UKRC projects. Second, this effect is stronger in the
most R&D intense regions and industries, in particular for smaller and
less productive firms. Third, benefits from publicly-funded R&D pro-
jects are significant in particular when collaborating with domestic and
industrially related partners, regardless of the number or size of pro-
jects. Fourth, business growth is mainly driven by EPSRC and Innovate
UK support, with a particularly relevant role played by Innovate UK in
fostering SMEs growth after the closure of the Regional Development
Agencies in 2012.
Overall, our analysis shows that public support by RCs has a strong
positive impact on participating firms’ growth in the short and medium
term. Our results reinforce those of other studies which have suggested
– albeit on the basis of a more partial and largely case-based assessment
– the benefits of public support for private R&D and innovation. Our
analysis also suggests new insights related to how the characteristics of
grant recipients, and the nature of research collaboration, effect the
impact of public support. For the UK, where recent policy announce-
ments point to significant increases in public support for private R&D
and innovation in future years, our central results are reassuring: in-
creasing levels of public support for R&D and innovation will have
significant effects on future growth.
Our sub-sample results, however, raise some questions about whe-
ther the current focus of R&D and innovation policy in the UK is con-
sistent with maximising additionality. Policy in the UK currently fo-
cuses on supporting excellence in R&D and innovation, with resources
allocated primarily through thematic competitions for funding. This
results in a concentration of support in high-productivity businesses.
Indeed, during our study period, our analysis of the Gateway to
Research database suggests that 65 per cent of public support for
business R&D and innovation in the UK was allocated to firms in the top
quartile of the productivity distribution. Our results suggest that sup-
port provided to these already highly productive firms has limited ad-
ditionality and growth effects. Additionality would be greater where
support can be allocated to smaller firms with lower pre-award
productivity. The size of grants – relative to the size of the firm – also
seems important in shaping additionality and could be used along with
prior productivity to guide the allocation of support. Over recent years
UK innovation policy has also adopted a strong sectoral focus. Our re-
sults provide support for this focussed approach suggesting that ad-
ditionality is greatest in more R&D intensive industries.
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, at this point
we only consider the direct impacts of public grant support for R&D and
innovation on firms. Spillovers or multiplier effects may significantly
enlarge these effects, while displacement or competition effects may
reduce them (Roper et al., 2017). Both should be considered in future
studies. Secondly, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, propensity score
matching does not fully eliminate concerns that unobservable factors
may explain grant allocation and post-grant performances. For instance,
many of the firms participating in UKRC funded projects (although not
all small firms) will also be receiving R&D tax credits.39 As no data is
available on which firms receive R&D tax credits we are unable to ex-
plicitly condition our matching on whether or not a firm receives an R&
D tax credit, or the value of any tax relief. As any additional R&D in-
vestment carried out by a firm as a result of participating in a UKRC-
funded project may increase the R&D tax relief received, it is con-
ceivable that our results may also capture the effect of this second
public innovation support instrument. Third, data linking, and the
timing of some grant awards in recent years mean that we are able to
consider growth effects for only around two-thirds of firms which
participated in publicly-funded science and innovation projects. Fourth,
despite all the robustness tests provided to assess the overall quality of
our methodological approach, our identification strategy could still be
affected by unobservable endogeneity bias. Further research is needed
to investigate new approaches to improve the identification strategy,
and in this regard information on all grants applications, including the
unsuccessful ones, would greatly improve the robustness of the policy
evaluation. Finally, our study focuses only on UK public support for R&
D and innovation. International evidence from similar on-going studies
may provide alternative perspectives reflecting different grant alloca-
tion mechanisms and selection priorities.
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